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Abstract
Is it true that in the history of East Asian cultures there was less “philosophy”, less “logic” 
and “rationality” before the process of modernization began in the nineteenth century? A 
number of scholars of East Asian Studies believe this is a form of prejudice. For example, 
Nishida Kitarō stated that in East Asian cultures there is another form of logic, which 
can be called the “logicus spiritus” (心の論理). This article examines the essential parts of 
this logic with regard to Huayan and Zen Buddhist philosophy, and is thus an effort at 
comparative philosophy. 
Keywords: Huayan Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, logic of “soku” (即), comparative philoso-
phy, philosophy in a globalized world
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Ali je res, da je bilo v zgodovini vzhodnoazijskih kultur manj »filozofije«, manj »logike« in 
»racionalnosti«, preden se je začel proces modernizacije v devetnajstem stoletju? Številni 
učenjaki vzhodnoazijskih študij verjamejo, da je to predsodek. Na primer, Nishida Kitarō 
pravi, da je v vzhodnoazijskih kulturah druga oblika logike, ki jo lahko poimenujemo »lo-
gična duhovnost« (心の論理). Članek raziskuje esencialne dele te logike s premislekom 
skozi filozofijo huayanskega in zen budizma in tako doprinese k primerjalni filozofiji.
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Introduction 
Someone who is fixed exclusively within the frame of the occidental philosophy 
tends to build up a dogma, which is that in the history of East Asian cultures there 
was less rationality, logic and philosophy before the modernization process that 
started in the nineteenth century1. In fact, while there are different characteristics 
between the philosophy of the Occidental World and that of East Asia, it is not 
valid to state that there was no philosophy in the latter before its modernization 
and contact with the West. A more correct statement would be as follows: Before 
the modernization of the nineteenth century there was no Western-style logic in 
East Asia. It is thus evident that there are two categories in philosophy: that of the 
West and that of East Asia. There is a lacks any formal analysis in saying that there 
was “less logic before modernization in East Asia”. In comparative thinking we 
set a certain category, for example, “philosophy”. If it is true that the “philosophy” 
of the West cannot be closely identified with the “philosophy” (tetsugaku 哲学) 
of East Asia, we have to compare their specific differences to grasp the respective 
characteristics of “Occidental philosophy” on the one hand, and East Asian phi-
losophy on the other. Then, by identification, we have a pair of principal concepts 
which are certainly in a complementary relation: the Philosophy in a Global World 
and the different aspects of the West and of East Asia.2 
1 This is a key issue in this context, and one of the most serious approaches to it is in Hegel’s Vorlesun-
gen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, in the chapters on India and China. In another work of Hegel, 
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, there are also chapters on Asia which present similar 
ideas. It was a common practice for European intellectuals at that time of the nineteenth century to 
try and establish their own encyclopedias of world cultures. While this can be seen as progressive, 
a pre-“interculturality” before the process of globalization that took place in the twentieth century, 
there remain a number of problems. The most important is that such writers (Hegel and others) 
only saw the surface of Asian cultures, with Europe and European ideas remaining central. There 
are thus many problems with Hegel’s chapters dealing with Asian religions and philosophy, such as 
the confused interpretation of Brahamanism (Hinduism and Buddhism). (Hegel 1986) 
 The fundamental reflections on the question of whether there was “philosophy” in East Asian 
before the process of modernization were presented by scholars during the period of the Meiji 
Restauration in Japan. The translation of a number of works and writings of Western philosophy 
meant that Japanese scholars had to find suitable words or make new terms using the existing 
Chinese characters. For more detailed information on this, see the article of Fujita 2009. 
2 For the method of comparative philosophy see the article of Hashi 2014b.
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From the Origin of East Asian Philosophy 
Western philosophy began in ancient Greece with a tendency to seek scientific, 
verifiable knowledge. Their method of progress was to use dialogos and dialektike, 
in which a certain theme must be analyzed by reflective and critical argument 
again and again, until an undividable truth can be found. Aristotle (2000) used this 
method from the beginning of his philosophia prima, in which he established his 
essential concept of ousia through sharp criticism of his teacher, and thus by attack-
ing the concept of an “idea” from Plato. To state and verify is an undividable truth 
which can be stated as a general category viewed from an observer’s position which 
is not mixed up with the represent of the thesis as an empirical person. (The person 
who can be injured by sharp criticism is out of the theme in those discourses.)
Criticizing and arguing against one who is an opposite the philosophical logics 
has its own mighty in view of a debate. Without any dependence on a personality 
one can execute one’s own opinion in a generalized position: the category as a firm 
statement for a generalized truth in dialogos, in which a principal truth must be 
shown as an undividable, irrefutable truth. The theoretical competence is highly 
developed; the abstraction of one’s own conception in a general category is always 
executed. But the other focus, which is less regarded, shows the following aspect: 
Categories are positioned by one’s own personality, and the states are also repre-
sented by one’s own personality. The represented positions must confirm that the 
stated truth is actualized by one’s whole body and mind, in which a correspondence 
must be found between one’s theoretical statement and one’s own practice in daily life. 
For an examination, if and how far the stated theory is corresponded with one’s 
own life practice, there is less method in Occidental philosophy which can be seen 
as fully valid in this regard. Aristotle is one of the philosophers who took full 
responsibility for the correspondence of his theory and his actual empirical life. 
However, in his way of sharp critique against his teacher, Plato according to Pla-
to’s “idea”, Aristotle executed his argument rigorously and without any hesitation 
or modesty. One’s own teacher is for a disciple quasi sacro sanctus––although this 
position was less valued by several representative thinkers in ancient Greece. Their 
philosophein has the noble purpose of grasping and unifying an irrefutable truth as 
a generated category, by which particular persons and personalities in one’s daily 
life are secondary problematics.
If we consider Aristotle’s criticism against Plato, most intellectuals from East 
Asian cultures will feel a kind of culture shock in a negative way, as the behav-
ior of Aristotle is the opposite of the principal concept of 礼 (禮 li), one of the 
well-known articles of the five principal categories of Confucian philosophy 
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(Confucius 1978)3. With regard to these different ways of thinking we can say: 
“Philosophy”in a global world is a unity, but it implies the uncertain “One”. 
Within this “One” we acknowledge various different characteristics and orien-
tations: The Uncertain Two between the European and East Asian Philosophy. 
Let us say––with regard to the original idea of Confucius’ Lunyu: the ways and 
systems of philosophical thinking in East Asia have beenstriving for another ap-
proach with regard to European and Occidental Philosophy: i.e., Philosophy (in-
cluding religions) in East Asian cultures aim to establish an ethical life for an eth-
ical society in the real world. This does not have the keenly critical dialogos which 
was used by Aristotle in argumentations in the above mentioned style. For this 
method of dialogue and dialectic in Occidental Philosophy, Aristotle’s critique is 
correct, as he was stimulated by the older knowledge of Plato and therefore devel-
oped several ideas as the direct successorof his teacher. A lot of queries about Pla-
to’s thoughts could be answered by Aristotle, so a critical dialectic continuum was 
created for the progress and a development of philosophy. The continuous process 
of renewal through argumentation about old and classical ideas accompanies the 
development of philosophy in the West. 
However, with regard to this “constant renewal” there is a philosophical question 
that arises, and this is whether this unity, namely the category of a “renewal by 
overcoming an old idea” is always for the best: Is the renewal of old ideas always 
valid only as a way of raising quality? Is an old idea only there to put us out of 
the “mainstream” which is dominant for a while only in a surface of a society? 
Evidently, the answer is No. Every intellectual in East Asia remembers the well-
known saying of Confucius: 温故知新, which can be interpreted as follows: “In 
evaluation and acknowledgement of the classics, humans are able to achieve new 
3  Some examples are found in vol. I. 2 (為政篇), paragraph 7: 不敬何以別. Confucius said in Lunyu 
(論語): “Things of that differ human and animals are respect and dignity inthinking and han-
dling,”: li 禮 (礼). The concept of li is bound to the modesty that the knowledge of human is only a 
part of the world and universe. Another part of Lunyu in the same volume I.2. paragraph 5 shows 
the special concept of li 禮 in accord of the relationship of children to parents xiao 孝: 生事之以
禮、死葬之以禮、祭之以禮. Confucius told: “Thinking and Practicing in things of life, thinking 
and practicing of things by death and in funeral, thinking and handling in celebration of life––all 
those should be manifested through the concept of li 禮.” Even if this part is focused especially to 
the respecting love of children to parents, the principle of the li can be interpreted generally that it 
is a concrete manifestation of respect with modesty in a true love to humans, beings in a world and 
universe. The handling of li as practice is accompanied by grasping of li as a theory. And vice versa: 
Theoretical understanding of li and its realization in handling are in a continual unity. A separation 
of theory and practice or a dualism of pure categories and a human as a user of the categories does 
hardly succeed in this philosophy, since philosophy (zhe xue 哲学) is oriented to grasp and realize 
the good and truth for human life for individual, public and society. 
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knowledge.” (Confucius 1978, 80)4 In other words, something new can emerge 
at the intersections of classic and modern thinking. Let us focus on the logical 
function of classical thinking and its essential mind on a philosophical level in a 
globalized world. 
The Logical Functions of the Term “soku”
When focusing on this issue, let us remember that in East Asian cultures there 
are a number of other approaches to philosophy, logic and science that have a long 
history, which can contribute and enrich our contemporary philosophy in a global 
world. One of the most important things in this case is the principle of logic. The 
meaning and function of soku 即 ( Jap. soku, Chin. ji) is well known to research-
ers of Buddology, but its philosophical significance and possible contribution to 
philosophy in a global world has not been clarified. For this reason comparative 
thinking in comparative philosophy is needed.
The term 即 ( Jap. soku) primary has the function of connecting one thing with 
another. This is often clear in the philosophy of Huayan5 and Zen Buddhism6, in 
which the terminological significance of this word has been shown.
But let us examine the function of logic more clearly. Here we are, as a mediator 
facing the cross-cultural dimension of European formal logic and the Huayan- 
and Zen logic of East Asia. As a preposition we have to notice that the term soku 
has its value, if different things, [A and B], in other words, [A and non-A] are in 
connection or bound together. If we find the same word twice, [A soku A] or [B 
soku B], it has less meaning, as it only shows a tautology in except of confirming 
the principle of the definition of identity. Sueki Takehiro (1921–2007), one of the 
most outstanding logicians in Japan (University of Tokyo), presented a unique 
thesis that the logics of soku in Huayan Buddhism has a special position––espe-
cially in view of the comparison between formal logic and analytical philosophy 
in the West:
1) soku includes the definition of identity––as [A is A], and [B is B].
2) It shows at the same time the definition of difference.
3) It shows the significance of “Transmission between A and B”, in other words, 
[A and non-A].
4 In vol. I. 2 (為政篇), paragraph 11, 温故而知新、可以為師矣.
5 In the original Huayan Buddhist texts this term is mostly shown in Takakusu and Watanabe 1990, 
684–92; Sueki 1980, 218–9.
6 See the original 金剛般若経, Vajrachedikā prajñā pāramitā sutra in Nakamura and Kino 1990.
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It is remarkable that 1) and 2), the definitions of two opposite categories, i.e. 
identity and difference, are shown at the same time in the same term. 
Excursus:
Just this point is difficult to grasp for many Western philosophers and lo-
gicians, who keep their frame of thinking only in a pure analytical philoso-
phy or formal logic (and thus in Western style). By their query or argument 
I would confirm that this is the most important characteristic of language 
and culture. It is characteristic that a Chinese script per se is built up on 
the basis that both opposite categories are integrated: Generally, many 
fundamental Chinese script shows a picture like an icon in the empirical 
world (like 日 as “sun” or 目 as “eye”). On the other hand, many other 
scripts present deep dimensional conceptions and meanings like the 考 
(think, conceive). A lot of Chinese scripts show the integrative character 
in combining an empirical picture and a conceptual truth like the 悟 
as the integration of the both parts, 心 (spirit or mind) and 吾 (I, self ). 
A clear cut dimension of meta-language and empirical language of objects 
can be hardly created by Chinese language per se, because the culture of 
Chinese scripts is bound to an “integrative relationship” of the totally dif-
ferent categories of “empirical truth” and “transcendental truth”. Maybe, 
this is not enough to persuade someone who thinks only in the frame 
of formal logics or analytical philosophy in Western style. But, this is a 
fundamental example to show that the fundamental character to define 
and integrate the both different things and categories is set as a principle 
in the Chinese language and culture. 
Anyway, A soku 即 A, twice the same, then nothing happens; it is a pure tautology. 
Only if there is a difference appearing, A and non-A, does there occur a kind of 
relationship. Identity and difference, both belong to “a pair of opposites”, but in 
well-organized harmony. The real core of the term “soku” is in reference to 3), the 
mutual transmission between different positions.
The foundation of logic is in general––in Chinese philosophy and Buddhist phi-
losophy in East Asia––is dealing with the world of the environment, the world of 
experience in a tangible life (Akizuki 1978; Hashi 2014a). Let us look at a phe-
nomenon arising out of this circumstance. In the world of nature there is nothing 
which is in every detail “only the same and identical” with another. Every plant 
has its own appearance and its identity, even if they belong to the same species. 
Here, we have to notice that this logic of Buddhist philosophy actually orientates 
to the “theory of relations”. The theory of substance (or substratum) is not in the 
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foreground in this part of Buddhism,7 because Buddhist philosophy focuses on 
the phenomena in the real world, the problems of real life, the causality of human 
suffering and that of other beings, and the ways of overcoming this. Things in 
the world always belong to the “running time” with a dynamic change of space. 
Every moment is emerging, staying shortly and vanishing forever. Nothing remains 
for eternity. Nothing remains substantial. What does remain is only the principle 
of “anitya” (無常 Jap. mujō), the running and vanishing of every being in time-
space. On the other hand there is something more remaining, i.e. the “relation” 
of things and beings through their causal, logical connection.8 Let us review this 
core, the theory of relation: A plant α finds itself in the same time-space with 
another plant β. They both present themselves with their own identities, but they 
do not struggle in brutality. They exist despite their own unities and identities in 
harmony. A co-existence of [A and non-A] in a complementary relationship is the 
core of this logic.
What Does It Contribute to the Philosophy in a Globalized World? 
Let us have a look at the construction of logic. [A soku B] means A and non-A in 
a co-existential relation in a full complementarity. [A soku B] never causes a negative 
relationship with regard to an isolation, for example hating or struggling violently. 
[A and B] are not substratums that exists forever, but they are beings in a co-relation 
of emerging, developing and vanishing. Because they are not eternal stable sub-
stratums, they both are striving for peace in co-existential relation. [A and B] are 
sō-soku 相即, i.e. they are in a mutual transmission and intra-relation in their mu-
tual encountering. [A] accepts [B], [A] accepts [ non-A], and vice versa. [A and 
B] are in the intra-relation sō-nyū 相入: [A] puts itself into the dimension of [B], 
and [B] also puts itself into the dimension of [A].9 Through this active exchanging 
of one’s own position, the transmission of energies from different characteristics 
7 Nāgārjuna: Mūla madhyamaka karikā in Weber-Brosamer and Back 2005; Nakamura and Kino 
1990; Nakamura 2005; Hashi 2014a.
8 Since Buddhism was a complex mix of religion and philosophical thought from the very beginning 
on, it problematizes the issues of real life phenomena, human suffering and the goal of overcoming 
this. A phenomenon of life is grasped in the middle of an empirical life. Because such life phenom-
ena are always changing dynamically, which is transmitted by different relations, a substantializing 
of particular things which is stable from any influence and disturbance from the empirical world is 
difficult to find and thus to confirm what actually is the essential being of a “substance” is. Instead 
of a theory of substance, theories to explain the “relations” of various changing phenomena have 
been proposed since Early Buddhism: see for example the term of pratitya samutpāda 因縁生起 in 
Takasaki and Hayashima 1993. 
9 See in Takakusu and Watanabe 1990, 503, 505, 691–2; Sueki 1980, 203–6.
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arises dynamically. Sueki Takehiro (1980, 218–9) called this way of Huayan logic 
the “Processual Dialectic of Harmony”.
The Contribution of the soku (即) – Logic for Interdisciplinary Studies
Principally we can say that in this soku-logic of the Huayan philosophy the things 
and beings [A and B] ([A and non-A]) are not “monades” in the originaland 
rigorous sense of Leibniz: Primarily then each of them is not shown as a closed 
organism. Particular things in Buddhism are not bound to a “substantiality”; in the 
Mādhyamika School since Nāgārjuna, everything is an “emptiness” i.e. free of sub-
stantiality. Each thing is not focused as a static one, but instead everything is chang-
ing “free of fix substance” dynamically in a real time-space relation. Their potenti-
ality for accepting and learning from others is enormous. Aand B have in their 
physical existence a “Field of Between” in which the different two (A and non-A) 
are encountering, communicating, crossing and emerging for each other. I call 
these particular kinds of things, which are “free of substance” in bounding to the 
environment, corpus, A, B, C (…) and so on. Each of them has a [Field of Between] 
in encountering with another one, in which the one (for example A) has its own 
characteristic, bodily existence and contents of self-consciousness. The latter is an 
open court for crossing, encountering, competing and completing. Every personal 
self has one’s own system of life, which I call “intra-system unity”. The others are 
extra-system-unities, and each one is not isolated from another. They are corpo-
ra (corpus in the singular) in an open court with their different disciplines and 
thinking systems. “The Field of Between” is a potentiality for inter-action, mutual 
transmission and intra-relation, and its possibility of emergence. With regard to 
our focal point there is just one important issue to note: It is not the field of aran-
dom mixing to a unity of any kind. To integrate different factors, [A and non-A], 
both must be compared cautiously from both positions of [A and non-A]. Every 
step of scientific and ethical thinking is bound to a comparative reflection. 
The “Corpus” in the “Field of Between” – How Does it Work?
I will use one term of Varela, “enactivism”,10 which positions an intra-system into 
an environment which is able to recognize a tangent between itself and other selves. 
10 For a comparative philosophical reflection to Varela’s enactivism and theories of Buddhist Psychol-
ogy (vijnapti matravada) see Shiba 2015. The corpus of one’s self, as a physical body and the ability 
to grasp, to memory and to keep an essential knowledge and cognition builds up this dimensional 
core of physical reality and cognitive unit. (Hashi 2014a; Hashi 2014b; Hashi 2015a) 
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The latter are the extra-systems. The corpus as an intra-system puts itself within the 
experience of inter-action, construes a dialectical field of tension, taking a query 
and question between one’s own intra-system and other’s extra-system-unities. It 
enters into the extra-system unity. It presents one’s intra-system with regard to 
a dialogue to come to the essential core of the problem, getting an answer in a 
higher level of “integration” of intra-system and extra-system unities (Hashi 2014a), 
by which the mutual transmission between intra- and extra-system is executed. A 
dynamic self-transformation based on comparative thinking is the key point to 
fulfil this process step by step. By grasping this pair of terms, [Intrasystem] and 
[Extrasystem], it would be irrational to assume that one is fixed executively to the 
position of an old style of analytical philosophy, taking that a “system” should be 
defined exceptionally as an objectivized unity by which a thinking person as an 
observer and operator is definitively separated from the objectivized thing. With 
regard to the above mentioned pair of concepts, the Intrasystem means [one’s own 
thinking unity] based on one’s bodily life and existence. The Extrasystem is some-
thing that is not similar or that cannot be integrated into one’s own thinking 
system. The theory of comparative thinking includes both units, the [Intrasystem 
and Extrasystem], whereas the thinking and acting one as an executor of its own 
bodily life finds itself confronted with both pair categories––in other words, the 
Identification and Difference.
Co-existential Mind of Huayan Buddhism as an Optimistic Utopia? 
– The Significance of the Logic of Intellectual Negation in Zen 
Buddhism
An empirical phenomenon of life is that we have to struggle to achieve the va-
lidity of our rights, opinions and existence in a society. A correct opinion alone 
does not help and support the ability to execute one’s own rights. The Huayan 
Buddhist philosophy orientates towards a beautiful world like the Network of In-
drah, which implies that every particular being has its own essential unity within 
its entelechy.11 If the core of the entelechy of [Alpha] arises, its essential being is 
reflected by another being [Beta] within its own essential nature. Reflecting from 
one jeweler to another, the world is fulfilled by respectable entelechies. Does this 
sound too optimistic when faced with a hard life? In the difficult world of human 
beings, we can complete the Huayan logic for dynamic harmony soku with the 
sharp and severe “logic of negation” of Zen Buddhist philosophy: 即非 soku-hi, 
11 The Net of Indrah: Nakamura 2004; Tsujimura 1985.
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the [negation of soku]12 a dialectic logic of the negation to [A and non-A] at the 
same time: The original expression was given in the Diamond Sutra (vajracchedikā 
prajñā pāramitā sutra) in its classic Chinese translation. “A is A. At the same time 
A is non-A: (Through these negations we can achieve a true knowledge, that) This 
is called A.” One criticism of Zen Buddhism is that it is oriented primarily to ex-
amine one’s own position, opinion and mind in critical and self-critical focus, and 
thus we must consider how far it is mixed up with a false position, with one’s own 
subjectivism or egoism of any kind. The sharp negation of “A is non-A” goes on to 
clarify the following point: The first A in a tautology must be examined dialecti-
cally from various viewpoints in problematizing the issues of “Why can we name 
it A?”, “What is A and what is non-A?” and also, “What is my self who decides this 
category A and another?” The self-critical questioning accompanies one’s own life 
and enriches the field of experiences. Moreover, in the middle of an inter-action 
with another, the sharp logical examination of 即非 soku-hi / non-soku works as a 
sharp negation to the soku-optimism, and accompanies the whole development of 
one’s own experience, thinking and communicating. It stimulates with a warning 
against optimism, syncretism and the lack of critical views. The core of the Huay-
an logic of “A soku non-A” and the cautiously critical and self-critical negation 
of the Zen Buddhist “soku-hi”, [A is A] and [A is non-A], [B is non-B, non-C …]
etc.”13 insists on the relationship of complementarity. Both logics are located in 
an open mind, in an open court for real and intellectual inter-action. Its principal 
orientation is the mind of transmission from one to another, a dynamic interac-
tion and the mutual transmission of the self and that of other selves in the Field 
of Between. In this mind the thinking and acting system is highly useful for the 
contemporary world, in which everything runs only at the level of brief informa-
tion with the only aim of getting more and more material profit for one’s own ego, 
which is isolated from others. 
What Results from the Combination of the Logic of soku and 
Non-soku?
The logic of soku 即 and soku-hi 即非 (non-soku), as a pair of logical principles, 
can open up a new area when applied to our thinking system in the contemporary 
world, for the following reasons.
12  即非の論理: Akizuki 1986, 22–25; Suzuki 1968, 380–3.
13 The dialectic construction of logic to grasp the problem of what is the [A] per se is similar to Hegel’s 
Wissenschaft der Logik, Die Lehre vom Wesen, the article of “Widerspruch” (Contradictory of A 
and non-A). See Hashi 2004 and Hashi 2002.
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1. It construes a cooperative logic for an interdisciplinary community.
2. It has an ability to distinguish what can be a similarity and what should be 
more and more questioned and should be discussed in an inter-activity.
3. It has an ability to achieve integration to an advanced level. The latter is able 
without mixing with an easy average, without simple and false harmonizing, 
without a one-sided dogma, without an ignorance of other’s entity.
4. It has the potential to achieve a one-minded group work for a community, and 
the Huayan logic of soku is the most effective approach to this issue.
5. It is able to reflect one’s own thinking and acting in human relations, especially 
in the logic of Huayan. 
6. The logic of soku-hi/non-soku in Zen has a direct contribution to getting and 
constructing a critical and self-critical mind.
7. It shows the relevance of complementary of [A and non-A]: The logic of [soku] 
and [soku-hi /non-soku] of Huayan and Zen Buddhist philosophy should be 
perceived as being in a complementary relationship.
Conclusion 
In regard on the contemporary society in our globalized world, things and be-
ings are often presented as collections of information that are constantly being 
added to. Self-identification and self-reference are always possible via the use of 
information technology, the media and social networks. Things are thus easy to 
“copy-paste-deliver” immediately, and thus send one’s data to many others. On 
the surface everything is related in digital networks. In a cautious view of re-
flections––reality is running in the opposite direction. A lot of human beings as 
different selves are isolated from the environment, and often have relations that 
depend on their portable devices, such as smartphones. As human society is char-
acterized by isolation and solitude, communication is lacking in many ways. The 
mind of a particular self falls into dependency on technology. The morality of a 
community cannot be construed in the ordinary way because every individual is 
mostly isolated from their own circumstance and environment. The most impor-
tant lack is that of personal interaction, a “transmission” from one to another, and 
thus the mutual transmissions from one to another and intra-relation in meaning-
ful communications are ignored. 
Within this kind of destruction of humanity, one principle of Huayan Buddhist 
philosophy, namely soku, enables us to remember the significance of mutual trans-
mission by members of human society, the relevance of a co-existential mindful-
ness. In the seven significant points outlined above it is evident that each has a 
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relation with another point, so that the logic of soku is able to construct a peaceful 
world and human community based on the principle of co-existence. 
The Zen Buddhist logic of soku-hi 即非 (non-soku) accompanies our reflection with 
its sharp criticism to avoid easy optimism. We should thus combine the Huay-
an Buddhist way of “soku” with the Zen Buddhist way of sharp criticism, soku-hi 
(non-soku), keeping both positions in mind, the affirmation of the Huayan utopic 
ideal and its antithesis from Zen in the realist position. With regard to this dialectic 
harmony, Zen Buddhist philosophy tries to discover contradictions of every kind, 
to examine a discrepancy between the ideal and reality. Through this kind of sharp 
observation and dialectic thinking people can reconstruct their lives and world day 
by day. The execution of this ideal has a tight relation with reality, in which a think-
ing and acting human is present to manifest his own ethical ideals through his 
bodily existence and interactions with other people and beings in the environment. 
In both principles of “soku” and soku-hi (non-soku) it is fundamental that each 
person is skilled in viewing the world and environment primarily not from an 
ego-centralized position, as the opposite approach is promoted in the Buddhist 
logic: this can be grasped as the “logic for co-existence”, and is like the “Logic of 
the Field” by Nishida Kitarō14, the founder of the so-called Kyoto School. (Nishi-
da 1965, 1966, 289) Humans, things and other beings in the environment should 
be focused on and grasped only from the wide enveloping view of the “Field of 
Co-Existence of the Whole World”. The background of this logic is the “logic 
of the essential mind” (心の論理 shin no ronri). It envelops things and problems 
not only from a dualist position of criticism, but also from a place of “compassion” 
(Sans. karunā) to share the problem of suffering with another, and thus suffering 
people could overcome their problems by using co-existential logic. 
The principles of soku and soku-hi (non-soku), are both useful in our time of global 
networks and communications, because the coupling of both dialectic positions 
stimulates us with reasonable questions as to how we can achieve meaningful 
communication in our daily lives. 
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